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Alexithymia is characterised by difficulty identifying and describing one’s own emotion. 
Identifying and describing one’s emotion involves several cognitive processes, so 
alexithymia may result from a number of impairments. Here we propose the alexithymia 
language hypothesis - the hypothesis that language impairment can give rise to 
alexithymia - and critically review relevant evidence from healthy populations, 
developmental disorders, adult-onset illness and acquired brain injury. We conclude that 
the available evidence is supportive of the alexithymia-language hypothesis, and 
therefore that language impairment may represent one of multiple routes to alexithymia. 
Where evidence is lacking, we outline which approaches will be useful in testing this 
hypothesis.  
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The role of language in alexithymia: moving towards a multi-route model of 
alexithymia 
Alexithymia is characterised by difficulties identifying and describing one’s emotions, 
and a tendency towards externally oriented thinking (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 
1976). Research has demonstrated the negative impact of alexithymia across a broad 
range of cognitive domains, in both typical and clinical populations, including decision 
making (Kano, Ito, & Fukudo, 2011), recognition of emotional facial expressions 
(Brewer, Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 2015; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; 
Grynberg et al., 2012), empathy (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 
2010), moral judgements (Patil, Melsbach, Hennig-fast, & Silani, 2016; Patil & Silani, 
2014a, 2014b), reward processing (Foulkes, Bird, Gökçen, McCrory, & Viding, 2015) 
and pro-social behavior (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, & Mobbs, 2013). While alexithymia 
severity varies in the general population, it is elevated in multiple psychiatric conditions, 
including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, substance and alcohol abuse, and 
feeding and eating disorders, as well as in neurodegenerative disorders and populations 
with traumatic brain injury (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Theodorou, 
& Summers, 2006; Pinard, Negrete, Annable, & Audet, 1996; Schmidt, Jiwany, & 
Treasure, 1993; Sturm & Levenson, 2011; Thorberg, Young, Sullivan, & Lyvers, 2009; 
van ’t Wout, Aleman, Bermond, & Kahn, 2007). Additionally, alexithymia is associated 
with emotion regulation impairment, increased risk of self-harm, and poorer therapy 
outcomes for some forms of psychological interventions (Norman & Borrill, 2015; 
Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & Joyce, 2011; Pandey, Saxena, & Dubey, 2011).  
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Understanding the causes of alexithymia therefore has clear implications for 
theories of emotion, decision-making and social cognition, and practical applications for 
mental health services. Work is beginning to address which cognitive processes are 
necessary in order to identify and describe one’s own emotions, and therefore which 
cognitive impairments may give rise to alexithymia. Much research has focused on 
interoception (the perception and recognition of the internal state of one’s body; Craig, 
2002, 2003, 2009). Nonetheless, the impairments associated with alexithymia are 
complex and high-level skills that presumably rely on, and interact with, a number of 
cognitive processes. The interoception hypothesis presents one account of how deficits in 
one cognitive process - interoception - may impact on the ability to identify one's 
emotions. However, there are likely multiple cognitive routes to alexithymia, which may 
exist independently of each other, or interact with each other.  
The current paper proposes that language impairment may contribute to 
alexithymia. At first glance, the role of language in alexithymia seems obvious, and even 
tautological. Alexithymia literally translates from Greek as “lack of words for emotion”, 
and a core element of alexithymia is a difficulty expressing (including talking about) 
emotions. However, there are deeper theoretical reasons to expect language to contribute 
to alexithymia, beyond this superficial overlap. Most, if not all, theories of emotions posit 
that language processes contribute to emotion processes, though the nature of this 
contribution varies between nativist and constructivist theories. According to 
constructionist theories, language processes may drive the categorization of emotional 
experience, and emotion words act as key components in children’s development of 
emotion concepts (see Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015). From a nativist 
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viewpoint, while emotion categories are innately specified, language still plays an 
influential role in the development of emotion schemas, emotional decision making and 
regulation (Izard, 2007b; see section “A role for language in theories of emotion” below).  
A recent review by Welding and Samur (2018) has highlighted the abnormalities 
in emotion-related language in alexithymia. However, in order to examine whether 
alexithymia arises due to broader language-related deficits, it is crucial to examine 
performance on non-emotional language tasks. If alexithymia is unrelated to language, 
other linguistic processes should be unaffected. In contrast, abnormalities in non-
emotional language would suggest a broader underlying linguistic deficit.   
Despite the hypothesized link between language and emotion processing, there 
has been very limited study of language abilities in alexithymia. This may be due to the 
finding that those with alexithymia are impaired on emotion recognition tasks that are 
non-verbal in design, suggesting that impairments are not limited to the language domain 
(Lane et al., 1996). However, this argument ignores the potential role of language in the 
initial development of emotional understanding. Furthermore, even tasks that do not 
include verbal stimuli or require verbal responses can be affected by language abilities. 
For example, acquired language impairment affects putatively “non-verbal” tasks: in a 
large group of individuals with acquired aphasia, language impairment influenced 
performance on picture-based reasoning tasks usually described as capturing “non-verbal 
IQ”  (Baldo, Paulraj, Curran, & Dronkers, 2015). Indeed, it has been argued that “There 
is no such thing as ‘nonverbal’ ability—only abilities that are expressed nonverbally” 
(McGrew and Flanagan, 1998, p. 25).  
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Aims and scope 
The aim of this review is to provide an overview of the existing evidence relevant 
to the alexithymia-language hypothesis, which suggests that language deficits contribute 
to increased alexithymia. While previous reviews have described emotion-related 
language abnormalities in alexithymia (Welding & Samur, 2018), the current article 
examines evidence for problems in language beyond simply emotion-related language, 
with the aim of ascertaining whether language problems might provide a causative 
explanation for alexithymia.  
First, we introduce the alexithymia-interoception hypothesis. Under this ‘multiple 
routes to alexithymia’ model, we predict that some populations may have alexithymia 
due to interoceptive impairment, while other populations may have alexithymia due a 
language problem. We then establish the theoretical basis for the role of language in 
emotion in more depth, under both nativist and constructionist perspectives. This is not a 
full review of theories of emotion, but is used to demonstrate that language impairment is 
expected to affect emotion processing under most, if not all, theoretical perspectives. We 
then address the challenges surrounding the contribution of language skills to the 
measurement of alexithymia.  
We then review the available evidence relevant to the alexithymia-language 
hypothesis, from typical adults and patient populations with late-occurring or 
neurodegenerative conditions, respectively. We also outline why the hypothesis of a link 
between alexithymia and language impairment should be investigated with 
developmental groups, particularly in developmental language disorder (DLD) and 
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children with language difficulties acquired as a result of hearing loss. Where direct 
evidence is currently lacking, we outline why a link would be expected in these 
populations, and why gathering direct evidence of alexithymia in these groups is of 
theoretical importance.  
Given the growing evidence relating interoception to alexithymia, we outline a 
theoretical model of how language impairment and/or interoceptive deficits may give rise 
to alexithymia. We suggest that interoception and language may play distinct, but 
potentially interacting, roles in the development of alexithymia, and that the contribution 
of each may vary across clinical and developmental populations. Further challenges that 
should be addressed and avenues for future research are then discussed. 
For clarity, it is worth noting other constructs that are closely related to, or 
overlap with, alexithymia. These include emotion differentiation/granularity, and 
emotional awareness. Emotional granularity (often referred to interchangeably as 
emotional differentiation; see Smidt & Suvak, 2015) describes the extent to which an 
individual can distinguish between emotional states (Barrett, 2004). A simple definition 
of emotional awareness is the conscious experience of emotions (Gu, Hof, Friston & Fan, 
2013). One could consider alexithymia to represent a trait, while other constructs may be 
thought of as more specific abilities, which are negatively associated with the broader 
trait of alexithymia: i.e. in cases of high alexithymia, there is lower emotional granularity 
and emotional awareness. This paper focuses on alexithymia, but many of the arguments 
made for the role of language in alexithymia could be applied to the more narrowly-
defined constructs of emotional granularity and awareness. 
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In addition, while the definition of alexithymia pertains to a difficulty processing 
one’s own emotions, there have been several other sociocognitive difficulties and 
demonstrated to be (moderately or strongly) associated with alexithymia (Grynberg, 
Berthoz & Bird, 2018). These include interpersonal difficulties, particularly decreased 
empathy (Grynberg, etal., 2010), poor emotion regulation (Pandey et al., 2011), poor 
mental health, difficulties recognizing others’ emotions (Brewer et al., 2015; Cook, et al., 
2013; Grynberg et al., 2012), and increased somatization (De Gucht & Heiser, 2003; 
Mattila et al., 2008). These problems in and of themselves are not definitive markers for 
alexithymia. However, in the absence of direct investigation of alexithymia in a given 
population, the presence of such problems make it plausible that levels of alexithymia are 
increased. As a consequence, this work should be considered both as a review of the 
available research, and as an opinion piece that advances a specific hypothesis and the 
ways in which it might be tested.  
Interoception and alexithymia 
Contemporary theories suggest that alexithymia may be, at least in part, a 
consequence of a primary deficit in interoception, the ability to perceive and recognize 
internal body states, including signals of fatigue, hunger, thirst, heart rate, respiratory 
effort, and pain (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011; 
Murphy, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2017; Murphy, Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 
2018; Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005; Wiens, 2005). Thus, individuals who struggle 
to identify their own emotions may also struggle to detect and distinguish non-emotional 
interoceptive states, such as thirst, hunger and tiredness. Indeed, individuals with 
alexithymia are objectively worse at perceiving their own heartbeat (Herbert et al., 2011; 
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Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016), muscular effort and taste (Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 
2018), are less likely to rely on interoceptive cues to gauge respiratory effort (Murphy et 
al., 2018). They also report difficulties recognising interoceptive cues associated with a 
broad range of internal states (Brewer et al., 2016; Longarzo et al., 2015). Individuals 
with alexithymia also report difficulties differentiating between emotion-related and non-
emotion-related interoceptive signals (Brewer et al., 2016). Relatedly, alexithymia is 
associated with increased somatising and unexplained medical symptoms (e.g. De Gucht 
& Heiser, 2003; Mattila et al., 2008), theorised to be due to misinterpretation of benign 
interoceptive signals as troubling medical symptoms (Larsen, Brand, Bermond, & 
Hijman, 2003; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991). Indeed, the links between somatisation 
and alexithymia extend back to the very conception of alexithymia in the 1970s (Sifneos, 
1973). In addition to behavioural work suggesting a link between interoception and 
alexithymia, neuroimaging and lesion studies indicate that alexithymia is associated with 
functional and structural abnormalities or damage to cortical areas involved in 
interoception, in particular the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000; Goerlich-Dobre, Bruce, Martens, Aleman, & Hooker, 2014; Gu et al., 
2012; Hogeveen, Bird, Chau, Krueger, & Grafman, 2016; Ihme et al., 2013; Moriguchi et 
al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, a number of the conditions that are characterised by an increased 
prevalence of alexithymia also show abnormalities in interoception. Objective 
impairments in interoception in clinical groups have been demonstrated using widely-
used cardiac measures of interoception, such as the heartbeat tracking and heartbeat 
discrimination tasks (in anxiety and panic disorder; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Paulus & 
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Stein, 2010; Yoris et al., 2015;  in alcohol and substance abuse; Naqvi & Bechara, 2010; 
Paulus & Stewart, 2014; Paulus, Tapert, & Schulteis, 2009; Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & 
Dunn, 2012; in depression; Dunn, Dalgleish, Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Harshaw, 2015; 
Pollatos, Traut‐Mattausch, & Schandry, 2009; in somatoform disorders; Schaefer, Egloff, 
& Witthöft, 2012; in autism; Garfinkel, Tiley, et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2016; in OCD; 
Lazarov, Dar, Oded, & Liberman, 2010; Stern, 2014; in eating disorders; Klabunde, 
Acheson, Boutelle, Matthews, & Kaye, 2013; and in schizophrenia; Ardizzi et al., 2016). 
In addition, other evidence highlights unusual interoception in clinical conditions. For 
example, patients with eating disorders atypical neural responses during the perception of 
hunger and satiety signals (Santel, Baving, Krauel, Münte, & Rotte, 2006). According to 
care-giver reports and free-feeding observations, patients with frontotemporal dementia 
show a disturbance in their food preferences and satiety levels (Ikeda, Brown, Holland, 
Fukuhara, & Hodges, 2002; Woolley et al., 2007). Substance and alcohol abuse is related 
to reduced sensitivity to reward signals and poor awareness of intoxication levels (for a 
review, see Volkow, Wang, Fowler, Tomasi, & Baler, 2010).   
In sum, there is compelling evidence for the role on interoception in the 
development of alexithymia. Nonetheless, it seems improbable that all cases of 
alexithymia will be able to be reduced to an impairment in interoception, or that an 
interoceptive difficulty can account for all clinical populations in which alexithymia is 
elevated. Interoception has long been considered to be necessary for emotion (Darwin, 
1965; Gendron & Barrett, 2009; James, 1894; Lange, 1885), but language is also 
considered to underpin emotion processing (although the precise role of language is a 
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matter of debate). In the following section, we outline why a language impairment may 
be affect emotion processing, and ultimately result in alexithymia.  
A role for language in theories of emotion 
Over the decades, many different theories of emotion have been proposed (see 
Brosch, Portois & Sander, 2010, and Moors, 2009, for comprehensive reviews of theories 
of emotion). While there are numerous ways of categorizing this broad spectrum of 
theories, one approach is to place these theories on a continuum anchored by nativist 
theories at one extreme and constructionist theories at the other. Both types of theory 
ascribe some role for language in the development of emotion processes, although they 
differ in the extent to which language is considered “foundational” for emotion 
categorization (see Sauter, 2018, for a recent discussion). 
Nativist theories of emotion, such as Differential Emotion Theory (DET), argue 
that certain discrete emotion categories (“basic emotions”) are innate, having evolved for 
their adaptive value (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007a, 2009). These categories cannot be 
created, taught, or learned via cognitive processes. Even so, language is still afforded a 
central role in emotion-related processes within nativist theories: while language may not 
have a role in the ontogeny of basic emotions themselves, theories such as DET argue 
that language is crucial in the development of emotion schemas, which involve emotion 
interacting dynamically with perception and cognitive processes. Emotion schema 
development is considered important, as dysfunctional connections between emotion, 
cognition and action are thought to lead to psychopathology (Izard, Youngstrom, Fine, 
Mostow, & Trentacosta, 2006). Furthermore, recent reviews that outline evidence against 
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linguistic relativity of emotions still acknowledge a role for language in later-occurring 
cognitive processes central to emotion. For example, Sauter (2018) suggests that verbal 
processes may affect decision-making during emotion categorization, even if the 
categories themselves are not the product of linguistic processes. 
At the other end of the spectrum, constructionist accounts such as Conceptual Act 
Theory (CAT) (Barrett, 2006), or the circumplex model of affect (Posner, Russell & 
Peterson, 2005), suggest that the “natural kinds” of emotion proposed by nativist 
accounts do not exist. Rather, discrete emotion categories are the result of conceptual 
processes acting on underlying dimensional, non-specific affect. Emotion categories are 
not considered to be pre-destined by evolution but rather to emerge, dependent upon 
culture and development.  
Accounts such as CAT do not argue that the structure of individuals’ emotional 
experiences is wholly determined by linguistic factors. Rather, language is one of many 
factors that contribute to emotional development. One proposed mechanism by which this 
occurs is that emotion words support the acquisition of conceptual knowledge, just as 
labels support category acquisition and the development of conceptual knowledge in 
other domains (for instance, in learning abstract spatial relations between objects; see 
Casasola, 2005. See also Althaus & Mareschal, 2014; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008). For 
example, a child may hear the word “angry” in several scenarios, which have little 
perceptually in common: they may witness a friend get “angry” at the theft of a toy, they 
may be told their caregiver is “angry” at them, or their own behavior may be labeled as 
“angry” during a tantrum. The phonological form “angry” links together these perceptual 
and behavioral experiences of a child’s own and other people’s anger, in a variety of 
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scenarios (see Lindquist et al., 2015). Emotion words thus act as a catalyst in developing 
acquired equivalence between category members. In support of this position, children’s 
use of emotion words correlates with behavioral performance in categorising emotions; 
children’s increased production of different emotion labels during free labeling 
corresponds with increasingly differentiated and adult-like categorical perception of 
emotional facial expressions (Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008), and the presence of emotion 
labels facilitates the categorisation of emotions in childhood (a label superiority effect; 
Russell & Widen, 2002).  
In addition to this developmental evidence, it has been suggested that language 
continues to contribute to emotion processes in adulthood (Lindquist, 2017). It is argued 
that cues to another’s emotional state (e.g. a person’s facial expression) are variable and 
ambiguous, and that verbal labels act to reduce this ambiguity and therefore assist in 
efficient processing of emotion information (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; 
Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006; see also Lindquist, Satpute & 
Gendron, 2015, for a review).  
Clearly, under either account, language plays an important role in emotion 
processes, and language difficulties would be predicted to disrupt emotional abilities. 
According to constructionist accounts, a language deficit may prevent or delay the 
development of conceptual categories for labeling one’s core affect, and negate the 
advantageous contextual effects on emotion recognition provided by emotion language in 
adulthood (Lindquist et al., 2006). Within nativist models, a language deficit would leave 
the innately-endowed discrete basic emotions untouched, but could lead to abnormal 
emotion schemas, leading to poor recognition of one’s own emotions, and emotion 
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regulation difficulties. The notion that alexithymia could be a product of language 
deficits is therefore in keeping with both nativist and constructionist approaches; the 
alexithymia-language hypothesis does not depend on the adoption of any particular 
theory of emotion.  
The measurement of alexithymia 
One requirement for research examining the relationship between language ability 
and alexithymia is the careful consideration of how alexithymia should be measured.  
Alexithymia is usually assessed via self-report questionnaires, which may be problematic 
(Gaigg, Cornell & Bird, 2016). Potential issues with self-report measures are not limited 
to those with language problems. Even for those without language difficulties, highly 
alexithymic individuals may lack insight into their emotion-specific difficulties, causing 
individuals with alexithymia to fail to identify and report their own deficits. Furthermore, 
it is also possible that those with low alexithymia rate their levels of alexithymia as high, 
due to low self-esteem or a positively-biased representation of others’ abilities.   
In addition to these general concerns, the current self-report measures for 
alexithymia may be particularly problematic for language-impaired samples. First, for 
individuals with pronounced language difficulties, self-report data may be inaccurate 
unless questionnaires have limited language demands. Second, there is conceptual 
overlap between language and emotional problems in some questionnaire items. For 
example, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale’s “Difficulty Describing Feelings” subscale 
includes items such as “It is difficult for me to the find the right words for my feelings”, 
and (the reverse-coded) “I am able to describe my feelings easily” (Taylor et al., 1988). 
LANGUAGE AND ALEXITHYMIA 
15 
 
Control items that assess how easily an individual finds it to describe other, non-
emotional things, or to find other classes of words, would reduce this issue, but are 
currently not assessed by self-report alexithymia measures.  
In some cases, measurement issues may be overcome by gathering multiple 
sources of information about alexithymia, including parent- or observer-report, but these 
approaches come with their own additional considerations. First, developmental language 
impairments have been shown to run in families (Bishop, 2006). Thus it is possible that 
parents of children with language impairment also have some language or literacy 
difficulties. Second, self-report and observer-report measures of alexithymia do not 
always agree (e.g. Griffin, Lombardo, & Auyeung, 2016). Discrepancies could arise for 
multiple reasons; some individuals with alexithymia may lack the metacognitive ability 
and insight into their own impairments to rate themselves as having alexithymia, while 
these problems may be readily apparent to close relatives. Alternatively, given that 
individuals with alexithymia produce fewer emotional facial expressions, find expressing 
emotions harder and less beneficial, and have more interpersonal problems (Loiselle & 
Dawson, 1988; Lumley, 2004; Spitzer, Siebel-Jürges, Barnow, Grabe, & Freyberger, 
2005; Trevisan et al., 2016), parents or partners may lack insight into the emotional 
abilities of the child or spouse.  
Despite these concerns, self-report measures of alexithymia are highly predictive 
of emotional abilities (Lumley, Neely, & Burger, 2007), suggesting that many individuals 
with alexithymia do have good insight into their difficulties. It may be the case that self-
report measures are more appropriate for some individuals than others. Those with 
particularly severe language or interoceptive difficulties, for example, may struggle to 
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recognize and report alexithymic tendencies. The development of objective tests for 
alexithymia is therefore a clear priority for such research with these populations. One 
possibility is that explored by Gaigg et al. (2016); participants’ galvanic skin response 
(GSR) was monitored while participants viewed emotion-inducing stimuli and rated their 
emotional response along a simple scale. Correlations between participants’ GSR and 
emotional ratings were strongly associated with self-reported alexithymia (r = -.57), 
suggesting that the discrepancy between physiological responses and emotional ratings 
might provide an alternative measure of alexithymia that is less demanding of verbal 
skills than self-report questionnaires.  
In summary, measurement of alexithymia in language-impaired samples currently 
poses a challenge. Potential solutions include: routinely including control items in self-
report measures that capture broader linguistic difficulties; gathering observer-report 
alexithymia measures as well as participants’ self-report; and the development and 
validation of tests that do not rely on self-report.  
Existing Evidence for the alexithymia-language hypothesis: Language and 
alexithymia in non-clinical adult samples 
Although alexithymia is thought to be a dimensional trait, individuals who score 
above a clinically-significant cut-off on measures such as the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(Taylor et al., 1988) are considered to be alexithymic, and constitute approximately 8-
10% of the general population in Western samples (Franz et al., 2008; Linden, Wen, & 
Paulhus, 1995; Salminen, Saarijärvi, Äärelä, Toikka, & Kauhanen, 1999). While few in 
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number, studies on language abilities in relation to alexithymia in typical adults have 
been conducted.  
Several studies report that individuals with alexithymia produce fewer emotion-
related words than those without (Luminet, Rime, Bagby, & Taylor, 2004; Roedema & 
Simons, 1999; Wotschack & Klann-Delius, 2013), although only one study has measured 
the production of other word categories. This is important, as reduced expression of 
emotion may reflect the fact that those with alexithymia are generally less verbally 
expressive than those without, rather than specifically less expressive about emotion. The 
available evidence supports a general reduction in expressivity; individuals with 
alexithymia are also more likely to not respond to non-emotional stimuli. In two studies 
the difference in the absolute number of emotion words produced by those with 
alexithymia can be accounted for statistically by their total word production (Roedema & 
Simons, 1999; Wotschack & Klann-Delius, 2013). Where differences in the proportion of 
emotion words (rather than just absolute number of emotion words produced) have been 
found (Luminet et al., 2004), there may nonetheless be other word categories with 
reduced expressivity. Emotion words represent a class of abstract words, which are 
typically acquired later and show evidence of slower processing than concrete words 
(Schwanenflugel, 1991). Alexithymia may be associated with reduced use of abstract 
words in general, rather than emotion words specifically, but differences in use of 
abstract words would not be apparent from the coding of the data used in studies thus far.  
Evidence for a relationship between verbal IQ and alexithymia also suggests that 
verbal abilities may have a mediating role in the association between alexithymia and 
poor performance on emotion-related tasks. Significantly lower verbal IQ scores have 
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been reported in those with alexithymia, compared to control participants, and controlling 
for verbal IQ reduced the effect of alexithymia on processing of emotional facial 
expressions to non-significance in some cases (Hsing, Mohr, Stansfield, & Preston, 2013; 
Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Rossi, & Baldaro, 2011; see review by Grynberg et al., 2012). 
Weaker verbal IQ may reflect abnormalities in language skills, such as vocabulary, 
syntactical skills, verbal reasoning, receptive or expressive abilities. However, as no 
studies have examined the association between alexithymia and specific structural 
language abilities in the general population, the exact nature of this verbal weakness in 
alexithymia remains unclear.  
Existing evidence for the alexithymia-language hypothesis: Acquired brain injury 
and adult-onset neurodegenerative conditions  
The alexithymia-language hypothesis would predict that emotion processes would 
be detrimentally affected by acquired language disorders. Studying groups such as those 
who have acquired brain injuries or neurodegenerative conditions may elucidate the 
biological basis of alexithymia, specifically the potential role of brain regions thought to 
support language. Furthermore, evidence from adult populations, with presumably typical 
language and emotional development until the onset of illness or brain trauma, may 
reveal the role of language processes “online” in emotion tasks. That is, if language only 
plays a role in alexithymia during the acquisition of emotion concepts and knowledge – 
and language is no longer necessary to support emotion processing once this knowledge 
has been acquired – then an acquired language impairment may leave conceptual 
knowledge or emotion schemas intact. If, however, language processes continue to 
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contribute to emotion processing, then even late-acquired deficits in language should 
disrupt emotional processes and lead to alexithymia.  
A straightforward prediction of the alexithymia-language hypothesis would be 
that aphasia following stroke, in which key language regions suffer damage leading to 
lasting language impairment, would result in impaired emotion processes. Specifically, 
there should be more severe alexithymia in aphasic compared to non-aphasic stroke 
survivors. Although alexithymia has been examined in relation to stroke and suggested to 
be an important factor in the development of post-stroke depression (Hung, Chou, & Su, 
2015; Spalletta et al., 2001), no research has examined emotion processing abilities in 
aphasia following stroke. Instead, patients with aphasic symptoms are commonly 
excluded from such studies. 
Despite the lack of study of alexithymia in aphasia following stroke, other 
acquired or late-occurring conditions do provide evidence for an association between 
language and alexithymia. This includes evidence from patients with Traumatic Brain 
Injury (TBI). In such samples, verbal measures correlate significantly with alexithymia 
traits, and verbal abilities differ significantly between groups of TBI patients with and 
without alexithymia (Henry et al., 2006; Wood & Williams, 2007). Data from the large 
Vietnam Head Injury Study has recently demonstrated that damage to the inferior frontal 
gyrus, a key language region of the brain, is associated with alexithymia (Hobson et al., 
2018). Furthermore, this study demonstrated that patients with naming deficits suffered 
more severe alexithymia than those with intact naming abilities. This extends findings in 
the same TBI sample demonstrating a role for the anterior insula, a region considered 
crucial to interoception, in alexithymia (Hogeveen et al., 2016). Together, these findings 
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suggest that damage to either interoception-related or language-related brain regions may 
contribute to alexithymia. However, TBI samples commonly do not have focal lesions, 
but damage to several areas. Indeed, the proximity of the inferior frontal gyrus to the 
anterior insula makes it difficult to disentangle the role of language disruption (due to 
inferior frontal gyrus damage) from interoceptive failure (caused by anterior insula 
damage).  
Where neurodegenerative conditions are concerned, current data from 
frontotemporal dementia (FTD) suggest that either interoceptive or language impairments 
may underpin alexithymia. FTD is usually split into behavioural and language subtypes. 
In the behavioural variant of FTD (bv-FTD), the presenting difficulties at symptom onset 
are changes in personality, usually including a loss of empathy and emotional blunting. 
The language variants of FTD include progressive non-fluent aphasia and semantic 
dementia. In progressive non-fluent aphasia, speech becomes non-fluent, containing 
grammatical errors, and patients’ understanding of complex sentence structures is 
compromised, although word-level comprehension is usually preserved. In semantic 
dementia, speech is fluent but there is a loss of semantic knowledge, reflected in word-
finding difficulties and poor comprehension of previously known words (Bonner, Ash, & 
Grossman, 2010). As well as elevated rates of alexithymia (Sturm & Levenson, 2011), 
patients with FTD exhibit emotional difficulties associated with alexithymia, such as poor 
recognition of others’ emotions from faces and voices (Keane, Calder, Hodges, & Young, 
2002), and reduced carer-reported empathy (Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, & Grossman, 
2011). These difficulties are considered particularly characteristic of bv-FTD, but 
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emotion processing problems have been observed in all three FTD subtypes (Kumfor & 
Piguet, 2012).  
While alexithymia in FTD has been reported to be elevated relative to controls 
(Sturm & Levenson, 2011), there has been no direct comparison of alexithymia between 
the different FTD subtypes. However, indirect evidence from emotional difficulties 
associated with alexithymia supports the idea that different cognitive problems may 
underpin emotional impairments in the different subtypes. Specifically, we propose that 
emotion impairments are associated with interoceptive abnormalities in bv-FTD, but with 
language difficutlies in semantic dementia. For example, although facial emotion 
recognition is impaired in both semantic dementia and bv-FTD, controlling for verbal 
ability specifically reduces deficits seen in semantic dementia (Miller et al., 2012). 
Emotion word comprehension is impaired in semantic dementia, and correlates with 
comprehension of non-emotional abstract words, suggesting poor emotion word 
performance is driven by broader language disability in semantic dementia. These 
emotion word deficits are absent in bv-FTD (Hsieh et al., 2012). Conversely, the profile 
of impairments seen in bv-FTD is more in keeping with an underlying interoceptive 
cause. Interoceptive atypicalities in bv-FTD have been reported, including reduced 
responses to pain and temperature, feeding dysregulation and eating despite satiety, and 
increased sugar cravings (Fletcher et al., 2015; Miller, Darby, Swartz, Yener, & Mena, 
1995; Woolley et al., 2007). Furthermore, the anterior insula, a brain region considered 
key to both interoceptive and emotional processes, has been found to be particularly 
affected in bv-FTD compared to other FTD subtypes (Rosen et al., 2002; Seeley, 2010). 
Indeed, insula degeneration has been linked to interoceptive deficits (Woolley et al., 
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2007) and emotional deficits (Cerami et al., 2014) in FTD. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that in semantic dementia, emotion processing impairments may be largely 
accounted for by patients’ language difficulties, while in bv-FTD alexithymia may be 
associated with a more ‘pure’ interoception deficit. Drawing together the evidence from 
TBI patients and language-subtypes of FTD, acquired language disorders appear to affect 
emotional processes in adulthood. This suggests that linguistic processes are not just 
required for the development of emotional concepts, but that language continues to 
contribute to the processing of emotions in adulthood. In addition, the behavioral profiles 
of other adult populations, such as patients with bv-FTD, highlight the fact that 
alexithymic difficulties can occur in the apparent absence of a language problem. 
Collectively, these findings demonstrate that acquired interoceptive and linguistic deficits 
may each be sufficient to cause increasing levels of alexithymia in adult populations.  
Populations of Interest: Language-impairment, hearing-impairment and autism 
The alexithymia-language hypothesis predicts that language impairment during 
development will interfere with the acquisition of typical emotional knowledge and 
emotional functioning, and thus predicts developmental associations between language 
and alexithymia, with worse language resulting in more severe alexithymia. Here we 
consider whether such predictions are borne out by the available developmental evidence, 
including studies with autistic1, language-impaired and deaf populations. While there is 
very little direct evidence relating to the contribution of language impairment to 
                                                 
1 To respect the wishes of autistic individuals and report the study in line with scientific parlance, 
we use language preferred by clinical professionals (e.g., 'individuals with autism’), as well as the term 
‘autistic’, a term endorsed by many individuals with ASD (see Kenny et al., 2016). 
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alexithymia in these populations, the indirect evidence is reviewed here, as these 
populations are extremely interesting with respect to the alexithymia-language hypothesis 
and should be important foci for future research. The alexithymia-language hypothesis 
has clear predictions: if emotional development is dependent upon good language ability, 
then alexithymic traits should characterize all children with developmental language 
disorder (DLD) (previously known as Specific Language Impairment). In autistic and 
deaf populations however, language ability is highly heterogeneous. Therefore, if 
language impairment results in alexithymia, then one would expect language ability and 
alexithymia to co-vary in autistic and deaf populations.  
Alexithymia per se has not been studied directly in language-impaired children, 
although cohort studies provide evidence for a link between speech and language delays 
and alexithymia in later life (Karukivi et al., 2012; Kokkonen et al., 2003). Nonetheless, 
many difficulties common to children with language impairment fit with the notion that 
these children have alexithymia; children with language impairments show difficulties 
recognizing facial emotion (Merkenschlager, Amorosa, Kiefl, & Martinius, 2012; Nelson, 
Welsh, Trup, & Greenberg, 2011), difficulties with emotion regulation (Fujiki, Brinton, 
& Clarke, 2002) and social difficulties (Mok, Pickles, Durkin, & Conti-Ramsden, 2014; 
St Clair, Pickles, Durkin, & Conti-Ramsden, 2011), and are at an increased risk for poor 
mental health outcomes (Beitchman et al., 2001). Thus, the constellation of emotional 
difficulties reported in DLD is in keeping with higher rates of alexithymia than in the 
typical population. Indeed, clinicians have suggested that speech and language 
professionals ought to consider the impact that language deficits may have on children’s 
emotional processing, with explicit reference to alexithymia as a potential explanation for 
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links between poor language and emotional problems (Way, Yelsma, Van Meter, & 
Black-Pond, 2007).  
Evidence for the role of language in emotion and alexithymia can also be drawn 
from research with deaf children. Deaf or hearing-impaired populations present an 
intriguing opportunity to study the relationships between language development and 
emotion processes. First, while in DLD it is assumed there is some cognitive deficit that 
underlies the language learning problems, this is not presumed to be the case in deafness. 
Second, language difficulties are related to early linguistic experience, which varies in the 
deaf population; there is reduced opportunity for linguistic experience if deaf children are 
born to hearing families, whereas deaf children born to deaf parents experience rich 
conversational input through sign language from the start of life. Language delay is a key 
factor in impaired emotion recognition and empathy in hearing-impaired individuals, and 
group differences in emotion recognition and empathy between hearing impaired and 
control groups are removed when verbal ability is controlled for (Dyck, Farrugia, 
Shochet, & Holmes-Brown, 2004; Netten et al., 2015). There is also evidence, albeit 
limited, that linguistic input can ameliorate the emotion recognition impairment in this 
population (see Dyck & Denver, 2003).  
Reduced linguistic input for some hearing-impaired children thus leads to 
language delay, reducing understanding of others’ emotions. However, language delay 
may also affect deaf individuals’ ability to recognize and manage their own emotions. 
Indeed, children and adolescents with hearing problems show limited emotion regulation 
strategies (Rieffe, 2012). No studies have directly examined rates of alexithymia in deaf 
populations, or the potential role of alexithymia in the emotional processing deficits seen 
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in this group. The profile of emotional difficulties in deaf individuals, however, make a 
compelling case for investigating the role of alexithymia in emotional difficulties 
experienced by some deaf individuals. 
The population that has received the greatest research interest in terms of 
alexithymia is that of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (henceforth autism). The 
prevalence of alexithymia in autism is estimated to be around 50% (Berthoz, Lalanne, 
Crane, & Hill, 2013; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004). Autism and alexithymia are thus 
distinct but commonly co-occurring. Previous inconsistent findings regarding emotional 
deficits in autism, including difficulties with emotion recognition and empathy, may be 
related to the high but not universal co-occurrence of alexithymia and autism (Bird & 
Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 2010; Brewer, Happe, Cook, & Bird, 2015; Cook et al., 2013; 
Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016). Language functioning is very heterogeneous in 
autism; some individuals acquire age-appropriate language skills, while a significant 
proportion of autistic individuals remain essentially nonverbal (Howlin, Goode, Hutton, 
& Rutter, 2004; Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005).  
A seemingly straightforward prediction is that alexithymia will be associated with 
the language status of autistic children, but the wide variation of language skills in autism 
has yet to be capitalized upon by researchers. Language heterogeneity could contribute to 
the variability in terms of alexithymia seen in autism, but instead language or verbal IQ 
more generally is usually considered an extraneous variable to be controlled. Existing 
evidence also relies on less than ideal language measures. As in non-clinical alexithymic 
samples, participants with autism who also have alexithymia have lower verbal IQ than 
participants with autism but without alexithymia, and verbal IQ correlates with 
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alexithymia in the autistic population (although this may have been due to the inclusion 
of individuals with intellectual disability; Milosavljevic et al., 2016). As discussed in 
relation to alexithymia in the general population, verbal IQ measures alone do not allow 
for alexithymia to be related to specific language abilities.  
The pattern of emotional and social difficulties seen in children with disorders of 
language and communication is consistent with alexithymia playing a mediating role 
between poor language and emotional problems, and we predict that future investigation 
will uncover elevated rates of alexithymia in these groups. There is a clear theoretical 
case for examining alexithymia across these diverse developmental language-impaired 
groups. This would allow researchers to tease apart the contribution of specific language 
problems without known cognitive deficits (deaf children), specific language problems 
arising from cognitive deficits (DLD), and language problems in the context of a 
condition with broader social-communicative problems (autism) to emotion processes. 
Incorporating language into the interoception hypothesis of alexithymia: A multiple 
route model 
Substantial evidence exists for a link between interoceptive impairment and 
alexithymia (e.g. Murphy et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2018; Shah et al., 2016; Brewer et 
al., 2016; Herbert et al., 2011; Pollatos et al., 2005; Wiens, 2005). Although there has 
been limited direct study of the role of language, this review suggests that linguistic 
abilities are also likely to contribute to alexithymia. Given these two rather divergent 
streams of evidence, determining how they may be combined is likely to contribute to our 
understanding of alexithymia.  
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The ability to identify and express emotion is a high-level skill that presumably 
relies on many cognitive processes. The constructionist theory of emotion CAT argues 
that “core affect” (as it is termed in these theories) is categorized, and that the 
categorization processes involve language. While interoceptive failure is not explicitly 
discussed in CAT, core affect incorporates interoceptive information, and therefore 
arguably a failure of interoception is as likely to cause alexithymia as a failure in 
categorization processes. It thus seems likely that alexithymia may arise through 
impairment in any one of a number of processes, including interoception and language.  
While the interoception and language hypotheses of alexithymia are not mutually 
exclusive, a ‘multiple routes model of alexithymia’ would need to consider how these 
two abilities work together to influence the development of alexithymia. First, 
interoception and language problems may have additive and independent effects on 
alexithymia, and deficits in either domain may lead to an alexithymic profile at the 
behavioral level. This would suggest that aetiological subtypes of alexithymia may exist, 
in which either interoception or language is functioning typically. For example, 
alexithymia is elevated in eating disorder populations (Berthoz, Perdereau, Godart, 
Corcos, & Haviland, 2007; Lopez, Stahl, & Tchanturia, 2010), but individuals with 
anorexia nervosa are thought to have generally higher IQ and better scholastic 
achievement than typical individuals, factors highly related to verbal abilities. A language 
impairment therefore seems relatively unlikely to explain alexithymia in anorexia. 
Alternatively, interoception and language impairment may interact, and thus these 
two processes may not be entirely independent. For example, verbal labelling of 
children’s states by caregivers during development (e.g. “You must be hungry”, and 
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“You are so tired today”) may refine and tune categorization of interoceptive signals, as 
well as emotional states (Heyes & Bird, 2007). Poor performance on interoception tasks 
may thus arise as a downstream consequence of language problems that interfere with the 
processing and acquisition of these labels, and the ability to associate them with internal 
stimuli. Indeed, even in adulthood, language processes could continue to contribute to 
online interoceptive abilities. The ability to recognize a state could depend, to some 
extent, on one’s ability to rapidly verbally label the internal, and contextual, cues 
associated with that state. Beyond interoception itself, there may be an online role for 
language in tasks assessing interoception; for example, verbal working memory may be 
involved in the commonly used heartbeat detection task, while verbally labelling 
respiratory or muscular effort may aid performance on tasks assessing interoception in 
these domains (e.g. Murphy, Catmur et al., 2018; Garfinkel et al., 2016).  
Alternatively, interactive effects between interoception and language may arise if 
poor interoception impacts on a child’s language development. Certainly, an 
interoceptive impairment may mean that a child’s own internal states are poorly 
distinguished and therefore an unreliable target for the ascription of verbal labels. Thus, 
impoverished emotion vocabulary may be a secondary consequence of poor 
interoception. It is more difficult, however, to explain how poor interoception could lead 
to a general language impairment beyond specifically emotion or interoception-related 
language. Arguably, from a developmental perspective, interoceptive failure could lead to 
social abnormalities that reduce or interfere with key language learning experiences (i.e. 
interoceptive failure may reduce social engagement, and could lead to an individual being 
more excluded and thus reduce the opportunities for language learning experiences; see 
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Quattrocki & Friston, 2014, and corresponding commentary by Brewer et al., 2015). 
While acknowledging the possibility that an interoceptive impairment may result in 
social impairments that limit the opportunity for general language learning, it seems more 
likely that any interaction effect between interoceptive and language impairment is due to 
a general language problem impacting the development of accurate interoception, rather 
than an interoceptive impairment affecting solely emotion and interoceptive-related 
language. 
Challenges to the study of language and alexithymia and outstanding questions for 
future research 
The theories and evidence reviewed here identify a number of opportunities for 
future study. In addition, however, reviewing the available literature on linguistic ability 
and alexithymia revealed several challenges to this line of enquiry, including the 
measurement issues outlined previously. Further challenges are outlined here.  
The finding that alexithymia is elevated in language-impaired groups, or can be 
accounted for in other groups by considering language deficits, leads us to consider how 
“pure” alexithymia should be defined. If a child with language impairment has difficulty 
expressing themselves generally, a difficulty expressing their emotions is to be expected, 
especially given that emotions are abstract concepts, which may be particularly reliant on 
language during their acquisition. The same is true of a patient with a neurodegenerative 
illness whose language abilities have deteriorated. These individuals may technically 
score highly on an alexithymia measure, but should they be considered to have a different 
type of alexithymia to that which arises due to pure interoceptive failure? Is alexithymia 
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only “pure” if basic language (and other cognitive) deficits have been accounted for? The 
implication is that an alexithymia-like behavioral profile may, in some cases, be a 
secondary consequence of other non-emotion related cognitive decline, and not 
comparable to alexithymia in the absence of these broader deficits.  
This issue of what is “pure” alexithymia may be further illustrated by considering 
children who undergo schooling in their non-native language. These children may have a 
genuine difficulty with language in a certain context, which likely includes difficulty 
communicating their emotions (in a sense, a context-specific alexithymia). However, they 
would have a different cognitive profile to those with generalized language impairment or 
interoceptive deficits, and under the alexithymia language hypothesis would still be 
expected to have appropriate emotion concepts, and typical emotion recognition and 
empathy. Under our current conception of alexithymia, we would not regard these 
children as being alexithymic, but, as above, agreement needs to be reached with regard 
to what constitutes “pure” alexithymia.   
There are also significant methodological challenges when investigating 
alexithymia and its associated cognitive deficits in multiple developmental and clinical 
populations. Not least is the fact that, in several clinical conditions, language impairment 
is only part of a constellation of cognitive deficits. Research aiming to isolate the specific 
contribution of language to alexithymia should therefore control for other cognitive 
deficits that could feasibly contribute to alexithymia. Successfully isolating the 
contribution of language to alexithymia also requires consideration of the analytical 
approach. Several studies of alexithymia have claimed (e.g. Montebarrocci et al., 2011, 
Miller et al., 2012, Netten et al., 2015), on the basis of Analysis of Covariance 
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(ANCOVA) analyses in which verbal ability or performance on a language task has been 
the covariate, that differences between groups in terms of alexithymia or associated 
emotional abilities can be accounted for by verbal abilities. However, despite such 
approaches being widespread, the use of ANCOVA to address such questions is 
inappropriate (see Miller & Chapman, 2001). Better approaches include having multiple 
comparison groups that are matched versus unmatched on verbal abilities and also 
matched versus unmatched on other cognitive abilities (indeed it is very common in DLD 
research to have both a chronological age matched control group and a language age 
matched control group to control for cognitive and language abilities respectively), or to 
have a clinical group that can be dissociated on the basis of their language abilities (e.g. 
individuals with autism with and without accompanying language impairment) in the 
hope that the groups will be otherwise equivalent with respect to cognitive factors other 
than language. 
Of course, it must be recognized that much of the research on alexithymia to date 
has been performed in a limited set of cultural contexts. This feature of the existing 
research is important, as alexithymia prevalence has been shown to vary across cultures 
(e.g. Zhu et al., 2007; Ryder et al., 2008). While there has been debate about the extent to 
which alexithymia can be readily translated into different cultural contexts (see Dere, 
Falk & Ryder, 2012; Fukunishi, Nakagwa, Nakamura, Kikuchi & Takubo, 1997), it has 
been argued that alexithymia is present in a comparable form in a variety of cultures 
(Parker, Shaughnessy, Wood, Majeski, Eastabrook, 2005), but that culture-specific tools 
may be required to assess it. Differences in the prevalence of alexithymia may be 
expected given cultural variations in the importance placed on emotions or parental 
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socialization of emotional expression, both of which may contribute to cultural variations 
in alexithymia (Dere et al., 2012; Le, Berenbaum & Raghavan, 2002). As yet, cross-
cultural research into alexithymia has not considered variations in emotion labels as a 
potential explanation for differences in alexithymia. Variation in emotion terms across 
cultures, and how this does, or does not, impact on emotion perception, has been a central 
issue in the debate between nativist and constructivist theories of emotion (as discussed 
in Section 2.0). One prediction would be that rates of alexithymia over cultures would 
pattern with the number of words for emotion in that culture’s language(s). However, any 
investigation looking to isolate the effect of emotion lexicon size on alexithymia will also 
need to control for other cultural factors that may affect alexithymia. Indeed, such 
cultural factors and linguistic factors may not be independent; cultures that place less 
importance on the sharing of emotion may have fewer words for emotions. Nonetheless, 
research into the inter-relationships between culture, language and alexithymia could 
represent a way to study the relationship between emotion language and alexithymia, in 
those for whom typical brain development is assumed. Such research would be 
significant for understanding alexithymia, but also has clear relevance to the competing 
theories of emotion described in this article.  
Although these issues will need consideration, there are currently several 
intriguing lines of enquiry for future research to consider. First, this review has 
highlighted a number of populations in which the alexithymia-language hypothesis could 
be tested. In particular, alexithymia has yet to be directly studied in children with DLD, 
or adults with aphasia following stroke. Work with these populations represents a means 
to examine the role of developmental or late-acquired language disruption on alexithymia 
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and emotion processing more broadly. In addition, in exploring the literature on 
neurodegenerative conditions for this review, we noted the increased rates of alexithymia 
in HIV (Bogdanova, Diaz-Santos, & Cronin-Golomb, 2010), multiple sclerosis 
(Prochnow et al., 2011), and Parkinson’s Disease (Costa, Peppe, Carlesimo, Salamone, & 
Caltagirone, 2010). While language has received little study in these conditions, there is 
evidence that language processes are disrupted in multiple sclerosis (Friend et al., 1999; 
Lethlean & Murdoch, 1997; Prakash, Snook, Lewis, Motl, & Kramer, 2008) and in HIV 
(Chan, Kandiah, & Chua, 2012; McCabe, Sheard, & Code, 2007; Woods et al., 2006; 
Woods, Moore, Weber, & Grant, 2009). In Parkinson’s Disease, the majority of patients 
have speech problems, particularly affecting voice and articulation (Ho, Iansek, 
Marigliani, Bradshaw, & Gates, 1999), but these motoric speech-related problems are 
arguably quite distinct from the language processes that would be predicted to affect 
emotional functioning. Thus, Parkinson’s Disease may present a useful population to 
which those with multiple sclerosis and HIV-related dementia can be contrasted. 
Variation in language functioning, both in the aspects of language that are affected and in 
the severity of the deterioration, in these conditions represents promising avenues for 
future research, offering the potential to test different models of how language and 
alexithymia may be affected in different neurodegenerative diseases.  
Second, it will be crucial to understand which distinct aspects of language are 
related to alexithymia. Clearly, deficits in emotion-related language must be considered 
in the context of broader language ability, and if alexithymia is associated with some 
form of non-emotional language impairment, then investigation is required into whether 
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these difficulties extend to all language processes, or only to particular sub-skills, such as 
vocabulary, syntactic skills, pragmatic ability, or abstract language skills. 
Third, the relationship between language and interoception is as yet unclear, and 
the role language plays in the development of interoception and vice versa remains to be 
determined. Indeed, the factors required for the development of interoceptive skill are 
largely unknown at present. If language is found to shape interoceptive processes, this 
would contribute to the debate concerning constructivist and nativist accounts of emotion, 
as some nativist accounts argue that interoceptive experiences are innately given (e.g. 
Eckman & Cordaro, 2011; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Thus, understanding the inter-
relationships between alexithymia, interoception and language has implications not just 
for research on alexithymia and clinical populations, but also emotion theory.  
Summary 
Alexithymia is a construct that may not be reducible to one basic cognitive deficit 
across the wide array of populations in which it is observed. It seems not only possible, 
but probable, that there are multiple routes to the alexithymia phenotype. This review has 
put forward the case for language problems being one potential route to alexithymia, 
drawing upon competing emotion theories, and evidence from acquired and 
developmental clinical conditions in both children and adults. Alexithymia may be more 
likely to arise due to interoceptive difficulties in some clinical or developmental groups, 
and due to language difficulties in others. This model clearly requires explicit 
investigation, using identical methodologies across a range of populations. The current 
review highlights key issues around the measurement and conceptual nature of 
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alexithymia, but the proposals outlined here generate many testable questions for future 
research, including the separate and potentially interacting influences of interoceptive and 
language abilities on the development of alexithymia.  
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